



Is Reason The Only Master?

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ARTICLE DETAILS

Research Paper

Keywords:

Human Reason, Free Will,
Divine Command,
Accountability

ABSTRACT

In this paper, I have focused on how doubts about human reason can affect the development of normative ethics. I will discuss the development of rationalism and its consequences on the human as the moral agent and thought, and talked about the real strength that human reason have and make it clear whether it serve as the ultimate authority for moral legislation or not. I will discuss the nature of divine command and the need of revelation to determine how the theory of Divine command could be improved to tackle the challenges that had been made to it, to show that there is an another way to morality.

1. Introduction: Origin of Modern Man

Early thinkers like Plato and Aristotle were major contributors to the development of rationalism. The Aristotelian thought gained popularity in modern philosophy and grew quickly starting with the Renaissance. It peaked with Descartes, who, according to Nasr, in search of a new foundation for knowledge appealed not to revelation nor to intellect but rather to the individual consciousness of the thinking subject when he said "Cogito ergo sum". Nasr claims that the famous cogito of Descartes could have taken a turn toward tradition if he had referred to the primacy of the subject over the object in the way that the Vedantists consider atman to be the primary reality compared to which all externalized existence is maya. But it turns out that when Descartes claimed "I think, therefore I am," Nasr maintains that he was not referring to the Divine I or the Divine Self, which is the only thing that could be said "I," and to which Mansur al-Hallaj had alluded when he declared "I am the Truth" (ana'l-Haq), some

seven centuries before. Instead, he asserts, Descartes was speaking of his own self when he said I, it was Descartes' illusory self that was establishing its experience and thinking awareness as the basis of epistemology and ontology and the source of certainty.

Given these circumstances, even existence was subjugated to it and seen to be a result of it. Nasr argues that even though Descartes begins with the act of thinking, he might have said 'est' rather than 'sum' at the end, saying that thinking and awareness are proofs in and of themselves that God exists rather than that the thinker or "I" as an individual being. Descartes, however, broke with tradition and turned philosophy into pure rationalism, shifting the focus of European philosophy from ontology to epistemology and making the individual ego the hub of reality and measure of all forms of knowledge.

Knowledge was thereafter established in the cogito. That is to say, the topic of knowledge was now constrained to the sphere of reason and cut off from revelation and intelligence, neither of which were now seen as viable sources of knowledge of an objective order. According to Nasr, this has the effect of depleting knowledge of its holy substance to the point that everything that shares reality may be separated from the sacred. Worse yet, knowledge and science were now perceived as being wholly apart from the holy. For those who adhere to the rationalism inherent in Cartesian epistemology, whether consciously or unconsciously, as well as those who have resisted it from below with the kinds of irrationalism, the concept of a "scientia sacra" appears as a contradiction in terms to them [Musa yusuf, 2018].

2. Selfhood

Considering what it means to be reasonable might help us start our investigation. Subjective and objective rationality need to be distinguished. Objective rationality is responding rationally in the face of complete knowledge of the pertinent action circumstance, as opposed to subjective rationality, which is acting in line with one's views and opinions about the situation. The essence of objective rationality is behaving in conformity with reality while basing one's actions on one's views. We might also suppose that making decisions with sound judgement requires complete awareness of all important facts, their causal relationships, and the repercussions of those actions, with none of these considerations being momentarily overlooked or disregarded. One possibility is that an agent may think things through and decide beforehand what would be the most sensible course of action in a certain circumstance. Even if we assume that someone who is well-informed and carefully considers the matter does what he believes to be the reasonable thing to do in such case, there is still another problem at hand. Some individuals

think that under some circumstances, one may and does act in a way that is opposed to their best and most sensible judgement. Instead than focusing on whether an action would be considered sensible for the actor in the particular circumstance, we instead ask if it would be considered rational by unbiased, fully informed, clearheaded people.

My main criticisms of the majority of contemporary debates of morality and reason are on underlying presuppositions that guide the dialogue but are seldom subjected to rigorous examination. Most of us have cultural presuppositions about who we are, what we know, and what is true, were developed without consideration for morality or any other field of normative thought. The moral enterprise becomes extremely problematic in our contemporary culture, if we ignore the understanding of selfhood and its various scope.

Human Self: The human self is a knower-agent. I use this definition to distinguish people from simply behavioral agents, who respond to both internal and external inputs out of instinct or impulse. Humans are knower-agents who occasionally act on impulse or instinct in reaction to sensory stimuli, but more often than not, they reject impulse, impulsion, or stimulus out of hand. They control their behaviour not just via internal limits on instinct and impulsivity but also through knowledge, principles, plans, and thoughtful critical judgement. **Thinking self:** A thought is one's own when it is affirmed or accepted while one's mind is working as a unit, rather than when it is among a group of thoughts occurring in one's mind. A claim of truth calls for mental cohesion, and mental cohesion involves logical integrity. So being consistent and accurate in one's thinking is a normative need imposed by the very structure of the mind. **Moral Self:** In the same way that beings are committed to the unity and integrity of their minds, and as a result to the consistency and correctness of their perceptions, beliefs, and worldviews, as well as to the unity and correctness of reality, rational agents are committed to the unity and integrity of their lives, and as a result to the justification and worthwhileness of their actions. Internal imperatives rooted in our nature, drives us, which makes our moral self. Without the moral point of view being rooted in one's self-concept and recognised as founded in one's selfhood, moral feelings and assessments would be too weak to rule life [E.M. Adams, 1993].

Reliability of Reason:

The Western philosophical tradition has always placed a strong emphasis on reason and the problems that it raises. But being under attack from post-modernists and deconstructionists, the function of rationality has emerged as a critical issue that extends far beyond the purview of philosophy. The term "rationalism" represents a certain understanding of the nature of human behaviour, decision-making, and

well-being. Rationalism, in its broadest sense, adheres to an ideal of human self-development that entails maximizing people's discretionary power of choice and utilizing it to distinguish between goals that are, and those that are not genuinely desirable.

The intellectual part of the self must have control over its sensual nature and wants in order for the self to be satisfied, mature, and happy. In his widely read essay "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person" Harry Frankfurt expresses the rationalist ideal in very brief terms: "A person's will is free only if he is free to have the will he wishes. This implies that he is free to make any of his first-order desires the object of his will or to make another first-order desire the object of his will in its place. Of course, rationalism is not only a recent idea. On the other hand, the notion that we should be freed from our current impulses as much as possible is a staple of Western philosophical thought that dates at least to the Greeks. While the Greeks of the ancient era believed that moral behaviour was strongly related to the possibility of logical understanding, they also believed that the moral order was always in danger from unchecked desire. Although Plato holds the act of rational reflection has an impact on the emotions and motivations of those who engage in it and the view that the limitless efficacy of discursive reason is not assured and that more than reason is required to restrain the passions. Discursive rationalism, holds that reason itself is the most efficient tool for freeing the self from its shackles to a certain set of empirical wants. In some ways, discursive rationalism is the purest type of rationality. It affirms the unique ability of people to be inspired by the information they learn via introspection. The heritage of discursive rationalism, begins with Plato and continues through many schools of Greek philosophy to the degree as the latter represents the idea that philosophical inquiry is a necessary tool for achieving the ideal life in practise. The vein of discursive rationalism emerges as a theme in the philosophy of German Idealism, reaching its zenith in Hegel's vision of the unity of theoretical and practical rationality in Absolute Knowledge.

But discursive rationalism is not the only type of rationality. In fact, even Plato does not adhere only to discursive logic. Plato believed that intellect alone was insufficient to help us defeat our impulses if their power was not adequately restrained. Thus, another type of rationalism aims to change one's wants by rational action. Aristotle, who promoted training and habituation in the service of discretionary self control, is unquestionably the founder of practical rationalism. If Plato is the great proponent of discursive rationalism, then Aristotle is undoubtedly the founding father of practical rationalism. The idea behind this is that by consistently acting in a way that satisfies our needs, we may weaken the influence of undesirable impulses.

In the history of Western thinking, there is one more strategy for realizing the rationalist goal of human self-development that has been enormously influential. This viewpoint, which I will refer to as pessimism, often supports the rationalistic goal of self-mastery but contests the viability of the discursive or practical rational techniques at our disposal as means of achieving that goal. In the religious heritage of Christianity, pessimism is most strongly represented, and Saint Augustine is unquestionably its key character. Augustine said that without assistance, people cannot get to the truth. They are also unable to restrain their passions, because it is not driven by reason or the will, but rather by passion in our fallen state. The distance between fallen humans and genuine goodness is thereby doubled. First, they lack the wants that a genuinely excellent creature would have. Second, there is a gap between desire and action ability, so people are not even able to conduct their life in a way that fulfills those goals. For Augustine, being out of one's own control is a trait of being human. The rationalist methods prove ineffectual in dealing with stubborn impulses, especially when those desires are sparked by sensory experience [Michael Rosen, 2004].

3. Strength of Reason

The mysteries of nature are getting closer to being understood, but the secrets of good and evil are still unknown. The human nature is too complex to ever be reduced to a formula. The goal of morality is to direct people's behaviour. We strongly believe that there is something wrong with a rational explanation of good and evil that only informs us what is the case rather than what should be the case. We must accept personal responsibility for our decisions and the consequences of those decisions if we are to act morally at all. Making a decision is one thing, but knowing the facts about that decision is quite another. Rationalist, by the very definition, compiles information, including facts concerning our moral judgements, but we must create and bear responsibility for our own moral judgements via internal battles. Our search for a knowledge of good and evil has been complicated by our understanding of other cultures' ways of existence. We can no longer assert with the same ease and assurance that our methods are correct and those of outsiders or foreigners are incorrect. Given what we now know about other cultures' moral codes, we can no longer make the simplistic claim that ours is the correct way. Our moral confidence seems to be weakened by knowing about the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. The existentialists describe moral and political commitments as essentially involving an emotional or non-rational commitment or choice. They believe that we passionately live our decisions after making them without giving them a thought. A philosophy of life built on the idea of arbitrary choice or commitment is best exemplified by modern French literary philosopher Albert Camus. Camus holds that

moral principles are only the world's manifestations of our own inner desires. Instead of the rational world of our own or our culture's fairy tale, the world is ludicrous and irrational in reality. One only falls for a myth if they think moral principles have a reasonable foundation. We shall see that there are inherent criteria or standards for moral evaluations if we comprehend the kinds of functions or roles that morality—any morality, not just yours and mine—plays in the life of any community. These are apparently divinely-given natural moral principles are ones that we can perceive with our unassisted reason, they are rules that we just instinctively know to be true and that apply to all people regardless of race or culture.

They are indisputable moral rules, or self-evident moral principles. St. Thomas Aquinas presented this argument in its entirety in the Middle Ages, and modern scholastics have reiterated it.

A fundamental fault in rational theory of morality are not just in specifics but also in general terms. No moral conclusion can be drawn from a factual statement using the formal logic's principles for valid deduction. Understanding the practical role that morality plays in human existence will help us to see that there is no remarkable mystery around the rational justification of some of our moral judgments—though obviously not all of them. Moral statements are intended to direct action and change behaviour. They are merely indirectly forecasts made by reason. Rational judgment typically lack energy and a compelling appeal, or both [Kai Nielsen, 1957].

4. Need of Revelation

Because reason has its own field of knowledge, just as revelation and intellect do, reason cannot by itself refute the veracity of revelation. As opposed to what is believed in contemporary western philosophy. Nasr claims that because of its separation from the sacred, modern thought or knowledge has come to favour reason over intellect and revelation and, in fact, has reduced intellect to reason while defining man as a rational being without taking into account his intelligence as understood and defined in tradition. Due to its erroneous understanding of what reason is and how it relates to intellect and revelation, current philosophical thinking is unable to comprehend this. This suggests that the problem with the misinterpretation of revelation in contemporary western philosophical thought is not revelation itself, but rather the abuse of reason in a domain in which it is ineffective. The intellect and revelation are intertwined because without revelation, man cannot fully utilize this divine gift since he is already too far removed from his primordial nature. Only revelation can actualize the intellect in man and allow it to function effectively.

The intellect is reduced to mere reason in current philosophical thought, which maintains that it is the mind, not the heart, as it was in the past. Based on this, it also disregarded revelation as dogmatic since it cannot adhere to modern-day definitions of reason. In other words, intuitive knowledge and revelation were denied because they were non-analytical, discursive, or did not follow the scientific mode of knowing, which is common in modern philosophical thought. As a result, all knowledge became rational knowledge, which inexorably leads to rationalism, which is defined as "the exclusive use of reason independent of both intellection and revelation and the consideration of reason as the highest and exclusive mode of knowing" [Musa Yusuf, 2018].

I do not mean to imply that reason is unbounded. But I would like to put that any instance of deductive reasoning involves presumptions that are not itself derived. No coherent set of presumptions can provide all truths, according to Gödel's Theorem, and there we find the support of revelation [Robert Grafstein and Darrell Dobbs, 1988].

5. Revelation as Authority for Kant

If humans are free and often choose not to agree, reason cannot explain why we should heed its demand. If we believe that humans were made to be obedient and capable of being obedient, then the authority of self would compel all humans to be obedient. Revelation is crucial at the boundaries of reason, when reason is required to defend itself. Kant correctly sees that in order to be moral, one must presume both that moral acts can be completed successfully and that the universe as a whole is oriented toward moral progress. However, this conclusion cannot be reached via logic since it needs believing in a moral author of the universe. Reason demands obedience, but it cannot explain how this obedience is practically attainable. However, if we believe that there is a moral author who ensures the harmony of moral action and natural causes, and that this author is God, the possibility of obedience may be explained. The power of reason to logically address ever-increasing facets of the universe evolves as a result of divine education, which directs reason toward its own real end [Phil Enns, 2007]. A Divine Command Theorist is someone who believes that morality is founded on God's commandments, or that something, x , is bad because God forbids it, and another, y , is morally necessary because God mandates it. In terms of the Euthyphro problem, which states, is anything evil therefore God forbids it, or since God forbid it therefore it is evil? The first horn is chosen by divine command hypothesis, which contends that morality is influenced by religion in some way. Moral Autonomy Theorists, assert that morality is independent of religion and, if they believe in God at all, choose the second horn of the Euthyphro dilemma.

What drives the DCT is the fact that anchoring morality in God's commandments preserves not only moral objectivity but also essential theological beliefs about God's character, such as confidence in God's absolute power.

Kant states that in the case of freedom and morality, freedom is the ratio essendi of morality and morality is the ratio cognoscendi of freedom. The former implies that freedom creates the logical space for moral law. This implies that moral law has some form of actuality made possible by freedom, in which case freedom should be the ratio fiendi of morality.

The link between morality and freedom is simple enough: it is via morality that freedom is known to us, or as Kant puts it, "the moral law is the sole condition under which freedom can be recognised. Morality is determined by God "as its antecedent". This might imply that God is the one who brings into existence (ratio fiendi) or reason why (ratio essendi) of moral rules. If we consider God to be the moral lawgiver in the sense that God generates moral attributes in addition to all natural properties, then God is the ratio fiendi of morality. In this situation, God physically forces morality to exist. God is the ratio essendi of morality, not the other way around, since God is self-determining and morality is the reason of knowing (ratio cognoscendi) the religion, or by morality we know religion. As a result, Kant is a DCT in certain ways. In other words, all of our beliefs about God stem from practical reason. We can be certain that God would not mandate evil because logic tells us so. An ordinary DCT faces a dilemma since a world in which God orders evil cannot be ruled out. However, Kant is not concerned about it, since no such potential world is conceivable by practical reason. To imagine a God who commands evil is to engage in blatant contradiction. To put it another way, a moral language in which it is a responsibility to commit some horrible act, whether expressed by God or a lion, is not something we can comprehend. As a result, we would fail to understand any order to commit evil as a moral demand from God. The first approach is compatible with Kant's understanding of the nature of practical reason [A.T.Nuyen, 1998].

6. Nature of Divine Command

Commands are heavenly properties that persist eternally and independently of any earthly expression or manifestation. God does not issue a directive by speaking or adopting a specific mental state. God commands ceaselessly and forever just by being God. According to Asha'ri thought, God did not intervene in time by pronouncing real physical orders, rather aimed to fix specific situations, by mere intended meaning of 'action for' or 'abstention from', through his essence, and therefore it the command

is everlasting, universal truth. This viewpoint is encouraging for current divine command theorists because it allows us to argue that instructions is a meta-ethical principles.

We can develop a meta-ethical theory that takes into account a basic truth about the universe such that normative character of non-linguistic utterance lies within Creator essence. In this perspective, divine commandments are transcendent qualities with immanent potential. While it is evident that in Asha'ri philosophy, command is not the physical utterance that makes action, but by defining command as intended to depict the meaning of making action obligatory by virtue of an utterance.

In this sense, "meaning in the speaker's self" refers to the possible delivery of a certain style of speech that might motivate behaviour. This concept demonstrates that morality can be based on God, but not in the sense that God commands humans what to do, but rather that the objective judgments that accompany certain actions are a part of the universe's design by virtue of their being a subcategory of the everlasting word of God. This idea of divine command is not equivalent to replacing human autonomy with "another" omnipotent being. This theory sees divine commandments as a meta-ethical basis for a theory of practical reasoning that holds that God is the ultimate source of morality [Omar Farahat, 2016].

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