
Limits Of Institutional Mediation: The African Union’s Struggle In Ethiopia-Eritrea Conflict 1998-2018

Baston Kondowe

Master’s student, Department of International Relations, Universitas Indonesia
baston800@gmail.com

ARTICLE DETAILS

Research Paper

Keywords:

Conflicts, Liberal Institutionalism, African Union, Conflict Resolution

DOI:

10.5281/zenodo.14171112

ABSTRACT

This paper investigates the persistent difficulties of the African Union (AU) in mediating and resolving the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict from 1998 to 2018. The conflict remained unresolved despite numerous interventions, posing a significant research puzzle: Why did the AU consistently fail to mediate and resolve the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict? The study applies Liberal Institutionalism as its theoretical framework to understand the role and limitations of AU in conflict resolution. The research is significant as it examines the effectiveness of regional organizations, particularly in African interstate conflicts, and their broader implications for peace and security in the continent. Through a qualitative analysis of AU mechanisms, this study reveals that the AU's failure is attributed to ineffective intelligence sharing, limited enforcement of peace agreements, and a lack of cohesive coordination among member states. These findings contribute to a deeper understanding of institutional limitations in conflict mediation and suggest avenues for enhancing the role of AU in future peace-building efforts.

1. Introduction

The inability of the African Union (AU) to arbitrate sustainable peace in the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict between 1998 and 2018 highlights serious flaws in its framework for resolving disputes and

calls into question the organization's efficacy as Africa's main peacekeeping force. The AU failed to provide a lasting solution through its diplomatic efforts and enforcement measures despite its responsibility to promote peace and security. The disputed area of Badme, which Eritrea was granted in the 2000 Algiers Agreement, continues to stand as a testament to unsolved issues and the AU's failure to carry out its directives. Ethiopia's refusal to adhere to the Algiers ruling without repercussions from the AU calls into question the organization's authority and its influence over member states, especially in disputes involving regional power imbalances (Anebo 2017). This ongoing impasse underscores the AU's limited capacity to uphold peace in Africa, highlighting the urgent need for institutional reform.

The Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict not only reveals operational weaknesses in the AU's peacekeeping model but also points to deeper structural issues. Although equipped with the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) to pre-empt and mitigate conflicts, the AU lacks the intelligence-sharing capabilities necessary to address the rapidly shifting dynamics on the ground (Odello, 2021). Due to its inability to obtain and act upon timely intelligence, the AU's choices for intervention were severely limited, which reduced its effectiveness as a mediator. Furthermore, Ethiopia's unwillingness to execute border determination undermined the AU's credibility and allowed the conflict to go unchecked because it was unable to hold Ethiopia accountable without adequate enforcement measures. When theoretical frameworks, such as Liberal Institutionalism, run into real-world constraints, regional institutions face more significant difficulties, as seen by the organization's battle to establish control over member states in this high-stakes dispute.

Complicating matters further, Ethiopia's regional influence undermined the AU's neutrality, making it nearly impossible for the organization to balance the asymmetric power dynamics between the two countries (Zondi & Rejouis, 2006). As a regional power, Ethiopia's strategic interests in the disputed territories clashed with Eritrea's demands for territorial sovereignty, and the AU's inability to mediate this impasse reflected a lack of capacity to manage competing national interests. This conflict highlights AU's struggle to facilitate trust and cooperation between adversarial states, especially when power disparities and geopolitical priorities threaten its role as a neutral broker. These failures raise critical questions about the effectiveness of AU in fulfilling its peacekeeping mandate and call for an assessment of its institutional strengths and weaknesses.

Applying Liberal Institutionalism as a theoretical lens, this study critically examines the shortcomings of AU in intelligence-sharing, enforcement, and mediation in the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict.

Liberal Institutionalism posits that international organizations can foster cooperation by creating norms, promoting transparency, and enforcing agreements (Johnson & Heiss, 2018). However, these presumptions are called into question by the AU's limits in this conflict, as its operational and diplomatic shortcomings hinder its ability to effectively mitigate conflict or enforce compliance. Through qualitative analysis, this study makes the case that the AU is still ill-prepared to manage long-running conflicts on the continent in the absence of significant reforms, highlighting the urgent need for improved operational and enforcement skills to support its peace-building mission.


This study holds significant academic relevance by advancing the critique of regional organizations' capacity to enforce peace, particularly in Africa. The case of the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict underscores the limitations of Liberal Institutionalism in addressing entrenched geopolitical conflicts, suggesting that theoretical frameworks may need re-evaluation to account for the realities of regional power imbalances. By proposing necessary reforms, this research contributes to ongoing discussions about the effectiveness of regional organizations in conflict mediation, offering insights into how AU and similar organizations can strengthen their approaches to achieving sustainable peace.

2. Liberal Institutionalism

Liberal institutionalism finds its roots in the aftermath of World War I, a period marked by the devastation brought about by conflict and a collective desire to prevent the recurrence of such catastrophic events. The League of Nations, established in 1920, was an early institutional experiment representing liberal ideals (Amenta & Ramsey, 2009). While the League ultimately failed to prevent the outbreak of World War II, its existence laid the groundwork for future institutional endeavors.

In the post-World War II era, the birth of the United Nations (UN) marked significant development in liberal institutionalist thought. The UN aimed to provide a platform for diplomatic dialogue and conflict resolution, reflecting the liberal ideals of collective security and international cooperation (Amenta & Ramsey, 2009). This period set the stage for the gradual maturation of liberal institutionalism as a theoretical framework.

The crystallization of liberal institutionalism into a comprehensive theory owes much to the scholarly contributions of thinkers such as Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye. In the 1970s and the 1980s, they began to articulate the core tenets of liberal institutionalism, departing from the prevailing realist paradigm that emphasized power politics and state-centric behaviors.



Source: Skilla1st (2018) Figure I.1 Map of the Ethiopia-Eritrean Border

Liberal institutionalism in international relations advocates for the feasibility and sustainability of international cooperation between states. It is positioned as a potent tool for mitigating conflicts and reducing competitive tendencies among nations (Powell, 1994). Keohane's pivotal work, "After Hegemony," leveraged insights from new institutional economics to challenge the hegemonic stability theory by arguing that a stable international system could persist even without a hegemon. Keohane's arguments, echoed by other proponents of liberal institutionalism, underscored that international cooperation thrives through repeated interactions, transparency, and vigilant monitoring (Keohane, 2020). According to this perspective, institutions act as facilitators of cooperation by performing several crucial functions. Keohane and Martin (1995) argue for the following factors in bringing cooperation; providing essential information, enhancing the credibility of commitments, establishing focal points for coordination, fostering reciprocal behaviours, extending future foresight, and interlinking issues to elevate the cost of non-compliance.

In the realm of international relations, liberal institutionalism asserts that institutions play a key role in fostering cooperation among states. Advocates of this theory highlight the multifaceted variables through which institutions facilitate and sustain collaborative efforts on a global scale.

One of the core rationales behind how institutions drive cooperation, as posited by liberal institutionalists, is the reduction of transaction costs. These structures act as efficient mediators, minimizing the expenses associated with negotiations and agreements between states (Keohane & Martin, 1995). By providing a platform that streamlines interactions, Keohane and Victor (2011) argue that institutions enable smoother diplomatic processes, reducing the burdensome economic and temporal costs traditionally linked to international negotiations.

Moreover, institutions are lauded for their role in information provision. According to Keohane and Martin (1995), they serve as repositories of critical data, offering valuable insights and knowledge that aid decision-making processes between nations. This access to information contributes significantly to informed diplomatic discourse, allowing states to make strategic choices based on comprehensive understanding rather than speculation or incomplete data (Keohane & Martin, 1995).

A fundamental aspect emphasized by liberal institutionalists is the credibility of commitments within the international arena. Institutions function as guarantors, ensuring that promises made during

diplomatic engagements are credible and honored (Oye, 1985). This assurance of reliability enhances trust between member states, laying the groundwork for sustainable and dependable cooperation.

Furthermore, institutions serve as focal points for coordination among states. They provide a common ground where nations can align their efforts, strategies, and policies, facilitating more effective and harmonized cooperation (Fearon, 1998). This coordination fosters a conducive environment for mutual understanding and collaboration.

The principle of reciprocity is another cornerstone of how institutions encourage cooperation. Oye (1985) claims that these structures incentivize states to engage in cooperative endeavours, emphasizing the advantages derived from collaborative actions and the compromises necessary for sustained relationships.

Liberal institutionalists argue that institutions play a crucial role in extending the shadow of the future. According to Poast (2012), by highlighting the long-term consequences of actions and decisions, institutions discourage immediate conflicts and short-sighted strategies. This focus on future implications encourages states to consider the broader impact of their actions, fostering an environment conducive to cooperation and stability.

Moreover, institutions facilitate interlinkages of issues across various domains. Poast (2011) observes that institutions raise the stakes for noncompliance, making cooperation across multiple areas more attractive. This interconnectedness creates a web of mutual dependence, where cooperation in one area becomes a driver for cooperation in others, thereby strengthening collaborative efforts on a broader scale.

Utilizing the lens of liberal institutionalism provides a robust framework for understanding the complexities of international cooperation and conflict resolution. This theory emphasizes the crucial role of institutions in fostering collaboration among states through mechanisms such as providing critical information and ensuring credible commitments. By employing liberal institutionalism, it becomes possible to dissect the African Union's endeavors to resolve the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, shedding light on the institution's challenges in aligning with the theoretical expectations of facilitating effective mediation, information sharing, and trust-building between conflicting parties. This theoretical approach offers a structured analysis that allows for a comprehensive examination of the institutional limitations encountered in addressing intricate geopolitical disputes within the African context. The framework's

delineation of specific indicators provides a clear roadmap for assessing the effectiveness of institutions, allowing for a detailed examination of the challenges faced in conflict resolution efforts.

Liberal Institutionalism has been chosen for this because it offers a robust framework for understanding the AU’s role in mediating the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict by focusing on how international institutions and established norms can influence state behavior and conflict resolution. This theoretical approach underscores the significance of institutional mechanisms, rules, and norms in fostering cooperation and managing disputes between states. For instance, similar studies have applied Liberal Institutionalism to evaluate the effectiveness of regional organizations in conflict resolution, such as how the European Union's institutional frameworks have influenced peace-building efforts in post-conflict Europe. These studies demonstrate how adherence to institutional norms and mechanisms can shape the success of mediation and conflict resolution processes. Therefore, utilization of this framework facilitates the assessment of whether the AU's efforts align with the theoretical ideals of effective conflict management, particularly in terms of transparency, reciprocity, and institutional credibility.

Based on the above discussion, as identified by Keohane and Martin (1995), the following are the factors through which institutions facilitate cooperation among states and this paper will utilize them to show how the shortcomings within these factors lead to the failures in bringing cooperation or resolving conflict. The question is what happens to the institution's efforts to bring cooperation if the variables in the table below are negatively utilized or have many shortcomings? There will be challenges or failure to resolve the conflicts just as in the case of AU in resolving conflicts between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Table II.1 Liberal Institutionalism and Variables

Variables	Information
Provision of Information	They act as knowledge repositories, offering vital data that aids decision-making processes between nations.
Making of credible commitments	Institutions enhance trust by ensuring that promises made during diplomatic agreements are reliable and honored.
Establishment of focal points for coordination	They serve as common ground for states to align their efforts and strategies, fostering effective cooperation.


Facilitation of the principle of reciprocity	Institutions promote the principle of reciprocity, encouraging cooperation and compromise between member states.
Extension of the shadow of the future	By emphasizing long-term consequences, institutions encourage states to consider the future implications of their actions, discouraging immediate conflict.
Establishment of the linkages of issues raising the cost of non-compliance	Institutions interconnect diverse matters, raising the stakes for noncompliance, thereby incentivizing cooperation across multiple areas.

Source: (Keohane & Martin, 1995) (Processed by the Author, 2024)

II.2 Operationalization of Theory

According to Liberal Institutionalism, institutions facilitate conflict resolution and mediation among states by providing information, making commitments more credible, establishing focal points for coordination, facilitating the principle of reciprocity, establishing the shadow of the future, and establishing the linkages for issues, which raises the cost of non-compliance. Below is the operationalization.


Chart II.2 Operationalization of Liberal Institutionalism



Source: (processed by author, 2024)

II.3 Analysis Model

Chart 11.3 Analysis Model



Source: (processed by Author, 2024)

3. Methodology

The paper has made use of qualitative research methods. As argued by Leavy (2010: 164), qualitative research attempts to interpret experience-based data by analysing the themes in the process of searching for meaning. It is however difficult to find the ultimate truth in a world where people hold different experiences and meanings on a single subject (Carter & Little, 2007). This can be minimized by interviewing a wide range of participants in the sampled areas. Carter and Little (2007) highlight that “qualitative data collection methods include observation, interviews, focus groups, collection of extra texts, elicitation of texts and the creation or collection of images”. This paper has used secondary data from international organizations' documents, academic literature and media releases.

The qualitative analysis is guided by the concept of liberal institutionalism to examine why the African Union has been unsuccessful in resolving interstate conflicts specifically Ethiopia – Eritrea. The analysis involves a close reading of the primary data, identifying key themes and patterns related to the conflict and AU structure.

4. Findings and Discussions

This section provides a contribution of Liberal Institutionalism in examining challenges affecting regional bodies in mediating and resolving interstate conflicts, particularly the AU in mediating the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict. As such, this section consists of the following sub-chapters, namely providing information to both Ethiopia and Eritrea (Inadequacy in Intelligence Sharing Compromise Conflict Resolution in Ethiopia-Eritrea), making commitments more credible between Ethiopia and Eritrea, establishing focal points for coordination between Ethiopia and Eritrea, facilitating the principle of reciprocity between Ethiopia and Eritrea, establishing the shadow of the future for Ethiopia and Eritrea, and establishing the linkages of issues, which raises cost of non-compliance in Africa.

4.1 Inadequacy in Intelligence Sharing Compromise Conflict Resolution in Ethiopia-Eritrea

Information serves as a cornerstone in conflict resolution, and the AU has made commendable efforts to establish mechanisms like the Early Warning System (EWS) (Ngwube, 2013). However, Bamidele (2016) observes that these initiatives encounter hurdles, leading to delays in sharing crucial intelligence, thereby impeding timely responses to conflicts. In several instances, the AU's lack of comprehensive intelligence sharing, and limited data analysis capacity has hindered its ability to swiftly intervene in emerging conflicts.

The AU's struggle to gather and disseminate accurate, timely, and comprehensive information about conflicts is evident. For instance, inadequate information sharing among member states remains a significant challenge, hampering the organization's ability to fully comprehend the complexities of various conflicts. This limitation inhibits the AU from developing nuanced strategies and taking proactive measures to address underlying issues effectively. According to Ngwube (2013), although the AU has endeavored to establish intelligence-sharing mechanisms, persistent challenges undermine consistent and reliable information flow among member states. These challenges include limited access to credible and real-time information, constraining the AU's ability to gain a comprehensive understanding of conflicts and hinder its capacity to take decisive actions (Bamidele, 2016).

Liberal Institutionalism posits that international institutions are essential for facilitating cooperation among states by providing information, reducing uncertainty, and fostering transparency. Keohane (1984) argues that institutions play a critical role in mitigating the risks of conflict by ensuring that states have access to accurate and timely information. However, in the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, the inadequacy in intelligence sharing by the African Union (AU) undermines this principle. The AU's failure to establish a robust intelligence-sharing mechanism has compromised its capacity to act as an effective mediator, as the absence of clear information exacerbates mistrust between Ethiopia and Eritrea, as observed by Kydd (2005), who opines that lack of information sharing can intensify conflicts.

In the context of the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, the AU's endeavors to share information and intelligence, particularly through mechanisms like the Early Warning System, encounter substantial challenges. The effectiveness of these mechanisms is impeded by persistent delays in sharing vital intelligence and the presence of incomplete information, which ultimately hinder a comprehensive understanding of the conflict (Rodriguez, 2011). Both Ethiopia and Eritrea maintain a degree of secrecy regarding their positions, resulting in a scarcity of timely, accurate, and transparent data available to the AU (Abbink, 2003).

The dearth of timely and accurate information significantly constrains the AU's ability to comprehend the conflict's intricate dynamics comprehensively. The lack of transparency and incomplete information sharing limits the AU's capacity to gain a holistic understanding of the complexities underlying the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict. Consequently, this information gap undermines the AU's ability to take proactive and informed measures in mediating the conflict effectively.

Additionally, Keohane (1984) supports the view that institutions reduce the likelihood of conflict by making information readily available, thus enabling more informed decision-making. The AU's struggles in gathering and disseminating intelligence demonstrate a significant gap in this function. Had the AU been more effective in sharing intelligence, it could have facilitated an environment where both Ethiopia and Eritrea were better informed about each other's intentions, reducing the potential for escalation. This, in turn, aligns with Kydd's (2005) assertion that adequate intelligence-sharing mechanisms can lead to more effective conflict resolution.

The Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict exemplifies a critical challenge faced by the AU in accessing credible and timely information, significantly impeding conflict resolution efforts. One of the primary barriers to resolving this conflict was the scarcity of comprehensive and reliable information concerning historical land claims and demarcation complexities (Okubaghergis, 2019). which hindered the AU's ability to gain a nuanced understanding of the conflict dynamics.

The historical and territorial disputes between Ethiopia and Eritrea were deeply rooted, spanning decades and often intertwined with intricate socio-political narratives. However, the AU encountered obstacles in obtaining comprehensive and accurate information regarding these historical land claims (Okubaghergis, 2019). The lack of detailed historical context and a comprehensive understanding of the intricacies behind these claims constrained the AU's ability to comprehend the depth and complexity of the dispute.

Moreover, inadequate intelligence-sharing mechanisms between Ethiopia and Eritrea further exacerbated the challenge. According to Odello (2021), both nations maintained a degree of opacity regarding their positions, making it challenging for the AU to access timely and accurate information critical for conflict assessment. The limited availability of real-time intelligence restricted the AU's capacity to conduct a thorough and informed analysis of the situation on the ground. Consequently, the AU's ability to proactively mediate the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict was significantly hampered. The lack of comprehensive and reliable information hindered the AU's capacity to anticipate potential escalations, accurately assess the implications of various actions, and devise informed strategies for conflict resolution (Okubaghergis, 2019). This information gap not only impeded the AU's ability to facilitate effective negotiations but also hindered the formulation of proactive measures to prevent conflict escalation.

4.2 Enhancing Credibility in Commitment Enforcement between Ethiopia and Eritrea

The AU has long been vested with the task of mediating and resolving interstate conflicts across the continent. However, one of its persistent challenges lies in making commitments more credible and enforcing decisions effectively. The AU's credibility in ensuring commitments and enforcing decisions remains inconsistent, undermining its efforts in conflict resolution (Gichuru, 2019). An illustrative example can be found in instances where sanctions were proposed due to non-compliance with peace agreements, as observed in the case of South Sudan (Ngwube, 2013). While the AU proposed sanctions in response to violations of peace accords, the enforcement and follow-through on these measures were lacking. This inconsistency in enforcing decisions undermines the trust and confidence member states have in the AU's commitments, weakening the organization's ability to effectively resolve conflicts.

The AU has indeed aimed to ensure the credibility of commitments made by member states in conflict resolution efforts. However, the challenge lies in enforcing these commitments effectively. Weak mechanisms for holding states accountable for their promises hinder the AU's ability to ensure compliance with agreements. According to Bamidele (2016), despite efforts to establish frameworks and protocols to hold member states accountable, the enforcement mechanisms remain inadequate. This inadequacy in enforcing commitments allows member states to renege on their promises without facing significant consequences. This undermines the credibility of the AU's conflict resolution efforts, creating doubts about the efficacy of its decisions and commitments. Such inconsistency weakens the AU's standing and influence in mediating conflicts, as conflicting parties may not perceive the organization as a reliable enforcer of decisions and agreements.

Liberal Institutionalism emphasizes the importance of credible commitments in international relations, with institutions like the AU expected to ensure that agreements between states are upheld. Keohane (1984) claims that the effectiveness of institutions is heavily dependent on their ability to make commitments credible, which is essential for fostering long-term cooperation. In the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, the AU has struggled to enforce the decisions made and commitments agreed upon by the conflicting parties. Despite proposing sanctions or punitive measures for non-compliance with peace agreements, the AU's inability to ensure the execution of these sanctions weakens the repercussions for nations failing to adhere to the agreed terms (Rodriguez, 2011). Ethiopia and Eritrea, facing proposed sanctions or punitive actions, have often circumvented or disregarded these commitments without facing

substantial consequences, undermining the credibility of the AU's conflict resolution efforts (Abbink, 2003).

Axelrod (1984) opines that institutions should create mechanisms that impose costs on states for renegeing on their commitments, thereby ensuring compliance. The AU's inability to impose such costs on Ethiopia and Eritrea reflects its weakness in fulfilling this role. As a result, both nations have prioritized short-term national interests over long-term peace, knowing that there would be minimal repercussions for non-compliance. This dynamic supports Fearon's (1998) argument that the absence of credible enforcement leads to the erosion of trust and cooperation between conflicting parties.

The lack of credible enforcement mechanisms has detrimental effects on the AU's ability to foster trust and confidence among the conflicting parties. The failure to hold nations accountable for their commitments erodes trust in the AU's mediation endeavors. It creates a perception that the AU lacks the capacity or resolve to follow through with proposed measures, allowing nations to disregard agreements without facing substantial repercussions. This erodes the credibility of the AU as a mediator and weakens its influence in facilitating lasting resolutions to the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict.

Moreover, Keohane (1984) argues that institutions help states overcome collective action problems by establishing expectations of future cooperation. However, in the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, the AU's inconsistency in enforcing commitments has eroded trust not only between the conflicting parties but also among other member states. This inconsistency aligns with Fearon's (1998) assertion that weak enforcement mechanisms can lead to the breakdown of institutional credibility, making it difficult to foster a cooperative environment.

4.3 Establishing Focal Points for Coordination between Ethiopia and Eritrea

The PSC within the AU framework serves as a focal point for coordination in conflict resolution (Cilliers & Sturman, 2004). However, the inherent disparities in member states' priorities, coupled with differing national interests, often hinder the effectiveness of this coordination (Ngwube, 2013). Illustratively, conflicts such as those between Ethiopia and Eritrea have highlighted the lack of consensus and unified action among member states, consequently impeding the AU's mediation efforts.

The establishment of focal points for coordination is critical for the AU's effectiveness in resolving conflicts (Bamidele, 2016). Nevertheless, achieving harmonized efforts among diverse countries with varying interests and priorities has been a substantial hurdle for the organization. While

the AU has platforms for dialogue and coordination, such as summits and councils, the complexities of coordinating diverse member states often lead to fragmented approaches, making cohesive and unified action a challenging endeavor.

Liberal Institutionalism highlights the importance of establishing focal points for coordination to facilitate cooperation among states. Keohane and Martin (1995) argue that institutions like the AU should serve as focal points that help harmonize the interests of member states, thereby creating a unified approach to conflict resolution. However, the challenges faced by the AU in aligning the diverse interests of Ethiopia and Eritrea highlight the difficulties in creating effective focal points for coordination. The AU's inability to establish a cohesive strategy due to the conflicting priorities of these nations has significantly undermined its mediation efforts, supporting Keohane and Martin's (1995) assertion that fragmented efforts reduce institutional effectiveness.

Consider the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The long-standing territorial dispute over the border town of Badme has persisted for years, and the AU's efforts to mediate this conflict have been hindered by the diverging interests of the involved parties. Ethiopia and Eritrea's contrasting priorities and vested interests have posed challenges in the AU's attempts to coordinate a cohesive resolution strategy. Similarly, in the conflicts between Sudan and South Sudan, the AU struggled to foster unified action due to the differing national interests and priorities of the involved nations (Ngwube, 2013). The resource-rich border regions and disagreements over oil revenue allocation complicated mediation efforts. The AU faced difficulties in establishing a unified approach to address the underlying issues, thereby impeding effective conflict resolution.

The lack of effective coordination among member states within the AU framework significantly undermines the organization's ability to mediate and resolve interstate conflicts. The absence of consensus and unified action limits the AU's efficacy in bringing conflicting parties to the negotiation table and fostering mutually agreeable solutions (Bamidele, 2016). The failure to establish focal points for coordination within the AU has considerable implications for its conflict resolution endeavors. Without cohesive and harmonized efforts among member states, the AU struggles to leverage its mediation capacities effectively (Ngwube, 2013). The inability to coordinate diverse interests and priorities leads to fragmented approaches, hindering the organization's effectiveness in resolving conflicts.

Fearon (1998) opines that without effective coordination, the efforts of international institutions are likely to be disjointed, diminishing their overall impact. The Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict illustrates this dynamic, as the AU's struggle to coordinate a unified response has hindered its ability to mediate effectively. The failure to establish a clear focal point for coordination not only complicates the mediation process but also reflects the broader challenges that arise when institutions fail to fully leverage their potential as unifying forces.

The intricate conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea underscores the African Union's struggle to coordinate divergent priorities among member states, thwarting its conflict resolution efforts. Despite the AU's role as a platform for dialogue and collaboration, it grapples with aligning the divergent interests and priorities of Ethiopia and Eritrea. Both nations hold distinct and often conflicting agendas, particularly concerning border demarcation and territorial control, posing substantial obstacles to forging a common ground for peace talks (Odello, 2021).

Furthermore, Keohane and Martin (1995) argue that institutions play a critical role in creating shared understandings among states, which is essential for conflict resolution. The lack of a unified approach within the AU in addressing the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict demonstrates the challenges that institutions face when they fail to establish effective focal points for coordination. This situation aligns with Fearon's (1998) view that the absence of coordinated efforts can lead to misunderstandings and further entrenchment of positions, making conflict resolution more difficult.

Ethiopia, strategically significant in the Horn of Africa, seeks to maintain its territorial integrity while preserving its regional influence (Bereketeab, 2009). On the other hand, Eritrea emphasizes its sovereignty and aims for international recognition, adding complexity to the already convoluted dynamics of the conflict (Bereketeab, 2009). These divergent goals and historical animosities between the two nations further complicate the AU's attempts to facilitate dialogue and reconciliation. The AU's struggle to harmonize these competing interests diminishes the effectiveness of its mediation initiatives in the Ethiopia and Eritrea conflict. The inability to align disparate priorities hampers the AU's ability to foster consensus or unified action among member states. Consequently, the lack of coordination impedes cohesive strategies or joint approaches required to navigate the intricacies of the conflict and establish a foundation for sustainable peace in the region.

4.4 Facilitating the Principle of Reciprocity between Ethiopia and Eritrea

Based on Gichuru's (2019) analysis, the AU stands as a pivotal organization in mediating interstate conflicts, yet it grapples with challenges in fostering the principle of reciprocity—a fundamental element in nurturing trust and cooperation among conflicting parties. Despite concerted efforts, the AU faces substantial hurdles in ensuring reciprocal actions or concessions, impeding its ability to effectively resolve and mediate conflicts among member states.

Reciprocity, a cornerstone principle in negotiations and conflict resolution, is often challenged by conflicting national interests among member states. Despite agreements or peace accords brokered by the AU, conflicting parties sometimes prioritize their interests over cooperation (Gichuru, 2019). This leads to violations or non-compliance with the agreed-upon terms, thereby undermining the principle of reciprocity and eroding trust among member states. The AU endeavors to facilitate reciprocity in negotiations, understanding its pivotal role in fostering trust and cooperation among conflicting parties (Bamidele, 2016). However, several challenges impede the organization's ability to ensure reciprocal actions. One of the key challenges lies in the inherent difficulty in fostering mutual concessions among parties entrenched in conflicting national interests (Ngwube, 2013). The uneven power dynamics or a lack of trust between conflicting parties often hinders the achievement of reciprocal actions or concessions, rendering it challenging to foster mutual cooperation.

Liberal Institutionalism places a strong emphasis on the principle of reciprocity as a means of fostering cooperation between states. Keohane (1986) argues that reciprocity is central to the functioning of international institutions, as it creates a framework where states are encouraged to cooperate by the expectation of mutual benefits. In the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, the AU's failure to effectively facilitate the principle of reciprocity has hampered its mediation efforts. The AU's inability to ensure that both Ethiopia and Eritrea perceive their concessions as being met with equivalent actions by the other side has led to a breakdown in trust, which Keohane (1986) opines is critical for maintaining long-term cooperation.

The longstanding Ethiopia and Eritrea conflict epitomizes the AU's challenge with fostering reciprocity among conflicting parties. Bereketeab (2009) argues that despite earnest efforts to broker peace agreements and encourage cooperation, both nations, entrenched in historical animosity and territorial disputes, prioritize their individual interests over collaborative gestures. This lack of mutual

concessions or reciprocal actions severely undermines trust-building efforts and significantly impedes the AU's mediation attempts in the region.

Ethiopia and Eritrea, entangled in a protracted conflict rooted in historical grievances and territorial claims, have struggled to engage in reciprocal actions conducive to peace-building (Bereketeab, 2009). The absence of trust and confidence between the nations has thwarted attempts at fostering mutual concessions or reciprocal gestures required for conflict resolution (Joireman, 2015). In the face of ongoing disputes and past confrontations, both countries prioritize safeguarding their individual interests rather than engaging in actions that could benefit both parties. The failure to foster reciprocity between Ethiopia and Eritrea presents a considerable obstacle for the AU's mediation efforts (Joireman, 2015). The lack of mutual concessions or reciprocal actions perpetuates a cycle of distrust and animosity, hindering any progress towards sustainable peace. Efforts by the AU to encourage cooperation or bilateral concessions to resolve the conflict have been futile due to the deeply entrenched positions held by both nations.

Moreover, Axelrod (1984) supports the view that reciprocity helps sustain cooperation by establishing a system of incentives and disincentives, encouraging states to adhere to agreements. However, the AU's failure to effectively implement and enforce reciprocal actions between Ethiopia and Eritrea has resulted in a situation where neither party feels compelled to make concessions, knowing that the other side may not reciprocate. This dynamic aligns with Axelrod's (1984) argument that without reciprocity, cooperation is likely to break down, leading to a continuation of conflict rather than its resolution.

Fearon (1998) argues that the absence of reciprocity can lead to a security dilemma, where states are more focused on relative gains than on absolute gains, which can exacerbate tensions. In the case of Ethiopia and Eritrea, the AU's inability to promote reciprocal actions has heightened suspicions and mistrust, making it difficult for either side to commit to peace. This supports Fearon's (1998) claim that reciprocity is essential for building trust and reducing the perceived risks of cooperation in conflict situations.

4.5 Establishing the Shadow of the Future for both Ethiopia and Eritrea

The additional notable challenge the AU faces is in establishing this shadow of the future effectively. The AU strives to highlight the enduring consequences of conflicts in its mediation efforts, aiming to encourage conflicting parties to consider the long-term implications of their actions (Pavšic, 2013). However, Bamidele (2016) argues that the effectiveness of this strategy is hampered by short-term political considerations and the immediate urgencies of conflicts. The immediate concerns and entrenched interests of conflicting parties often overshadow long-term considerations, diminishing the impact of future consequences the AU attempts to establish. For instance, in this conflict, despite warnings and sanctions imposed by the AU and the international community, conflicting parties were not significantly deterred from continuing non-compliant behavior (Ngwube, 2013). The lack of a substantial and credible 'shadow of the future' weakened the deterrent effect and failed to compel parties to reconsider their actions or engage meaningfully in conflict resolution mechanisms.

Liberal Institutionalism underscores the importance of building institutional trust as a foundation for long-term cooperation between states. Keohane (1984) argues that international institutions play a pivotal role in fostering trust among states by providing a stable framework for cooperation. However, the AU's struggles to build and maintain trust between Ethiopia and Eritrea reveal the challenges institutions face in conflict mediation. The repeated violations of agreements and the AU's inconsistent enforcement have eroded the trust necessary for sustainable peace, which Keohane (1984) claims is vital for any lasting resolution.

In the context of the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, the AU has struggled to establish a credible shadow of the future, effectively deterring non-compliant behavior. Despite the AU's efforts to propose warnings and sanctions as consequences for non-compliance, the absence of significant long-term repercussions weakens their effectiveness as a deterrent. This failure to instill a credible fear of future consequences significantly diminishes the AU's leverage in mediating disputes between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Axelrod (1984) opines that the iterative nature of interactions within institutions can help build trust over time, as states come to expect consistent behavior from one another. In the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, however, the AU's inability to ensure consistent adherence to agreements has disrupted this process, preventing the development of trust. The lack of trust has made it difficult for the AU to

mediate effectively, as both Ethiopia and Eritrea remain skeptical of each other's intentions, fearing that any agreement might be violated.

The Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, rooted in historical grievances and territorial disputes, has persisted for decades, with both nations engaged in a deadlock (Joireman, 2015). The AU, as a regional mediator, has attempted to leverage warnings and proposed sanctions as means of pressuring both countries to comply with peace agreements and resolutions. However, the lack of substantial and enduring future repercussions undermines the potency of these measures. Both Ethiopia and Eritrea, entangled in their sovereignty claims and territorial disputes, prioritize immediate interests over potential future consequences (Zondi & Rejouis, 2006). This disregard for future repercussions dilutes the AU's ability to influence decision-making or actions that could lead to conflict resolution. The absence of a credible shadow of the future hampers the AU's capacity to alter the calculus of non-compliance. In essence, the inability to establish clear and impactful consequences for non-compliance weakens the leverage and persuasive power of the AU in mediating the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict. Parties engaged in the conflict remain focused on their immediate goals and interests, largely unfazed by potential future penalties or sanctions proposed by the AU.

Fearon (1998) supports the notion that without institutional trust, states are more likely to engage in competitive behavior, which can prolong conflicts. The Ethiopia-Eritrea situation exemplifies this, as the AU's failure to establish a reliable and trustworthy framework for mediation has led to a focus on short-term gains rather than long-term cooperation. This aligns with Fearon's (1998) argument that the absence of trust undermines the effectiveness of international institutions in conflict resolution.

4.6 Establishing the Linkages of Issues, Which Raise the Cost of Non-Compliance in Africa

Establishing the interconnectedness of conflicts and issues to raise the cost of non-compliance among conflicting parties is the final challenge that AU encounters. (Pavšić, 2013). Despite attempts, the AU struggled to effectively demonstrate the broader consequences and linkages of non-compliant actions in these interconnected conflicts. Establishing linkages between different issues in conflict resolution processes holds immense potential. It allows for the elevation of the cost of non-compliance, urging conflicting parties to reconsider their stance and engage in more meaningful negotiations (Poast, 2012; Keohane & Martin, 1995). However, the AU faces significant hurdles in leveraging these linkages to exert pressure on conflicting parties.

The organization often attempts to connect various issues to conflict resolution, aiming to highlight the broader consequences of non-compliance. Efforts are made to illustrate the ripple effects of non-compliant actions, showcasing how they can exacerbate existing conflicts and impede regional stability (Bamidele, 2016). However, despite these attempts, the AU struggles to create substantial consequences for non-compliance due to difficulties in effectively leveraging the interconnectedness of issues (Pavšic, 2013). The failure to establish these linkages and effectively raise the cost of non-compliance significantly impacts the AU's ability to resolve and mediate interstate conflicts. Without the ability to demonstrate the gravity of non-compliance and its broader implications, conflicting parties may not feel compelled to reconsider their actions or engage meaningfully in conflict resolution mechanisms.

Liberal Institutionalism also emphasizes the role of economic interdependence in promoting peace between states. Keohane and Nye (1977) argue that economic interdependence creates mutual benefits that reduce the likelihood of conflict, as states become more invested in maintaining stable relationships. In the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, the AU's limited success in promoting economic ties between the two nations has hindered its ability to leverage economic interdependence as a tool for peace. The lack of significant economic integration has allowed political and military tensions to dominate the relationship, supporting Keohane and Nye's (1977) claim that economic interdependence is crucial for reducing conflict.

The Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict presented a formidable challenge for the AU in linking the dispute to broader regional stability and economic development. Despite efforts to emphasize interconnected issues for regional cohesion, both nations remained entrenched in their immediate territorial disputes, prioritizing their individual agendas over collaborative regional cooperation (Odello, 2021; Zondi & Rejouis, 2006). Ethiopia and Eritrea's focused attention on their border conflict significantly undermined the AU's ability to leverage interconnected issues effectively. The struggle to link the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict to broader regional stability poses a multifaceted obstacle for the AU. Both nations diverted attention away from the interconnected regional challenges. This strategic tunnel vision limited the AU's leverage to utilize broader regional stability and economic development as pressure points in mediation efforts. The AU's capacity to influence or compel action on these interconnected issues was substantially reduced due to the parties' overriding focus on their immediate disputes.

Furthermore, Keohane and Nye (1977) opine that institutions should actively promote economic cooperation as a means of creating incentives for peace. The AU's efforts to mediate the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict have not sufficiently focused on fostering economic ties that could serve as a foundation for long-term peace. The absence of robust economic linkages between Ethiopia and Eritrea has contributed to the persistence of animosity, as there are few economic incentives to prioritize peace over conflict. This aligns with the Liberal Institutionalism view that economic interdependence can act as a powerful deterrent to conflict.

Axelrod (1984) argues that the establishment of economic interdependence can lead to repeated interactions that foster cooperation and trust over time. However, the AU's inability to promote such interdependence between Ethiopia and Eritrea has limited the opportunities for these nations to engage in cooperative behavior, further entrenching the conflict. This situation reflects the broader challenge that institutions face in leveraging economic ties to promote peace, as highlighted by Liberal Institutionalism.

Conclusion

Significant institutional barriers prevent the African Union (AU) from serving as a regional peace mediator, as demonstrated by its failure to bring about a durable peace in the Ethiopia-Eritrea war between 1998 and 2018. This battle highlights serious flaws in the African Union's ability to enforce agreements, efficiently share intelligence, and settle disputes amongst countries with wildly disparate interests and power structures, despite the organization's purpose to maintain peace and stability throughout Africa. In addition to prolonging hostilities, the AU's poor ability to hold member states accountable for their obligations was brought to light by the failure to enforce the boundary determination that awarded Badme to Eritrea and implement the 2000 Algiers Agreement. This case underscores the challenges the AU faces when trying to manage conflicts in which regional power imbalances favour more influential states.

The AU's difficulty in this particular setting highlights a larger problem with liberal institutionalism: whereas organizations like as the AU are meant to promote collaboration through common rules and norms, their effectiveness is greatly reduced when they lack the structural authority to compel adherence. The incapacity to obtain and act upon timely intelligence led to the failure of the AU's Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and mediation efforts, which were meant to avert escalation

and promote transparency. The AU's situational awareness was compromised in the absence of an efficient intelligence-sharing framework, which limited its capacity to handle the rapidly changing dynamics of the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict. This restriction shows that, especially in areas where member states put national interests ahead of regional collaboration, institutional mechanisms are only as good as the organization's capacity to operationalize them.

Ethiopia's regional dominance eclipsed the AU's attempts to serve as an unbiased mediator, highlighting the organization's inability to handle unequal power dynamics. The AU's power was eventually limited by its incapacity to strike a balance between the strategic objectives of the two sides, as it found it difficult to build confidence or force significant compromises. In addition to undermining the AU's reputation as an impartial mediator, this imbalance raised doubts about the organization's capacity to mediate other African crises when negotiations are hampered by power imbalances and old grievances.

This study indicates that in order to improve the AU's role in conflict resolution, substantial reforms are required in light of these difficulties. The AU would be better equipped to maintain peace if enforcement procedures were strengthened, intelligence sharing was improved, and decision-making authority was increased. With these changes, the AU's capabilities would more closely match what liberal institutionalism demands of international organizations as agents of stability and collaboration.

Ultimately, this paper highlights the limitations of Liberal Institutionalism in addressing the realities of interstate conflicts in Africa. The AU's experience in the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict offers a cautionary lesson for regional organizations seeking to mediate protracted disputes. Without substantial structural and operational improvements, the AU risks repeating these failures in future conflicts, underscoring the urgency of institutional reform to strengthen its credibility and effectiveness as a force for peace in Africa.

Acknowledgement

I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to the lecturers in the Department of International Relations at Universitas Indonesia for their invaluable support and guidance. I also thank my classmates for their insightful feedback and encouragement throughout this research.

REFERENCES

- Abbink, J. (2003). Badme and The Ethio-Eritrean Border: The Challenge of Demarcation in The Post-War Period. *Africa: Rivista Trimestrale Di Studi E Documentazione Dell'istituto Italiano Per L'africa E L'oriente*, 58(2), 219-231. From <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40761693>.
- African Union Border Programme. (2013). *Delimitation and Demarcation of Boundaries in Africa*. Addis Ababa: Commission of the African Union, Department of Peace and Security.
- Amenta, E., & Ramsey, K. M. (2009). Institutional Theory. In K. T. Leicht, & J. C. Jenkins (Eds.), *Handbook of Politics: State and Society in Global Perspective* (pp. 15-39). Springer. doi:10.1007/978-0-387-68930-2_2
- Anebo, L. (2017). The Fallacy of Virtual Demarcation as a Primary Scheme of International Land Boundary Setting: Why the Eritrea/Ethiopia Boundary Conflict Remains Unreasonable? *Willamette Journal of International Law and Dispute Resolution*, 24(2), 257-295.
- Bamidele, O. (2016). The Role of the African Union (AU) in Preventing Conflicts in African States. *Journal of Human and Social Sciences*, 8(1), 69-78. From <https://journals.co.za/doi/pdf/10.10520/EJC192234>.
- Bereketeab, R. (2009). The Eritrea-Ethiopia Conflict and the Algiers Agreement: Eritrea's Road to Isolation. In R. Reid (Ed.), *Eritrea's External Relations: Understanding its Regional Role and Foreign Policy* (pp. 98-130). London: Chatham House.
- Cilliers, J., & Sturman, K. (2004). The Challenges Facing AU's Security and Peace Council. *African Security Review*, 13(1), 1-8.
- Eritrea - Ethiopia Boundary Commission. (2002). *Regarding Delimitation of the Border between The State of Eritrea and The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia*. From http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/PCA/Ethiopia-Eritrea%20Boundary%20Commission/Decision_13-4-2002.pdf
- Fearon, J. D. (1998). Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation. *International Organization*, 52(2), 269-305. doi:10.1162/002081898753162820
- Gichuru, O. (2019). The Role of the African Union in Fostering the Emerging Peace Process in The Horn of Africa (Hoa). In *Tana Papers 2019, A Collection of Policy Briefs, Political Dynamics 584 in the Horn of Africa: Nurturing the Emerging Peace Trends* (pp. 32-37). Addis Ababa: IPSS.
- Healy, S., & Plaut, M. (2007). *Ethiopia and Eritrea: Allergic to Persuasion*. London: Chatham House. From

<https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Africa/bpethiopiaer589itrea.pdf>

- Ikenberry, G. J. (2001). *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars*. Princeton University Press.
- International Colloquium Report. (2012). *The African Union at Ten: Problems, Progress, and Prospects*. Prospects. Berlin, Germany.
- Johnson, T., & Heiss, A. (2018). Liberal Institutionalism. In *International Organization and Global Governance* (pp. 123-134). doi:10.4324/9781315301914-11
- Joireman, S. F. (2015). Ethiopia and Eritrea: Border War. History Behind the Headlines: The Origins of Conflicts Worldwide. *Student Resources in Context*. From <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/232767004.pdf>
- Kaledzi, I. (. (2023, November 11). *Ethiopia and Eritrea: Is a New War Looming?* Retrieved November 19, 2023 from <https://www.dw.com/en/ethiopia-and-eritrea-is-a-new-war-looming/a-67394344>
- Keohane, R. O. (1984). *The Diplomacy of Structural Change: Multilateralism After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Economy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Keohane, R. O. (1993). The Diplomacy of Structural Change: Multilateral Institutions and State Strategies. In H. Haftendorn, & C. Tuschhoff (Eds.), *America and Europe in an Era of Change*. Colorado, Boulder: Westview Press.
- Keohane, R. O. (2020). Understanding Multilateral Institutions in Easy and Hard Times. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 23(1), 1-18. doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-050918-042625
- Keohane, R. O., & Joseph, S. N. (2000). Introduction. In J. S. Nye, & J. D. Donahue (Eds.), *Governance in A Globalizing World*. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press.
- Keohane, R. O., & Martin, L. L. (1995). The Promise of Institutional Theory. *International Security*, 20(1), 39-51. doi:10.2307/2539214
- Keohane, R. O., & Victor, D. G. (2011). The Regime Complex for Climate Change. *Perspectives on Politics*, 9(1), 7-23. doi:10.1017/S1537592710004068
- Kibrik, R. (2019). *Lessons from the Peace Process Between Ethiopia and Eritrea*. Retrieved November 18, 2023 from <https://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Lessons-from-the-peace-process-between-Ethiopia-and-Eritrea>
- Kurtbağ, O. (2018). Purposes and Roles of Regional Organizations in the International System. In Ç. Erhan, & E. Akdemir (Eds.), *Regional Organizations*. Anadolu University.

- Mearsheimer, J. (1995). The False Promise of International Institutions. *International Security*, 19(3), 5–49.
- Ngwube, A. (2013). The African Union and Its Conflict Resolution Apparatus. *Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review*, 2(8). From [https://www.arabianjbm.com/pdfs/OM_VOL_2_\(8\)/5.pdf](https://www.arabianjbm.com/pdfs/OM_VOL_2_(8)/5.pdf)
- Nuruzzaman, M. (2008). Liberal Institutionalism and International Cooperation after 11 September 2001. *International Studies*, 45(3), 193-213. doi:10.1177/002088170904500302
- Odello, M. E.-E. (2021). Odello, M E. In *The 1998–2000 Eritrea-Ethiopia War and Its Aftermath in International Legal Perspective* (pp. 265-284). doi:10.1007/978-94-6265-439-6_11.
- Okubaghergis, B. G. (2019). The Eritrea-Ethiopia Border Region (1991-98): People without a Border. *Northeast African Studies*, 19(2), 65-89. From <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.14321/nortafriitud.19.2.0065>
- Omer, M. K. (2023). *Analysis: Are Ethiopia and Eritrea on the Path to War?* Retrieved November 19, 2023 from <https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/11/07/ethiopia-eritrea-war-tplf/>
- Oye, K. A. (1985). Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies. *World Politics*, 38(1), 1-24. doi:10.2307/2010349
- Pavšic, P. (2013). Pavšic, P. (2013). The African Union: A noble idea or an effective provider of peace and security on the African continent? *Consultancy Africa Intelligence*.
- Peace and Security Directorate. (2008). *African Union Peace and Security Framework and Mechanisms*. Addis Ababa: Peace and Security Directorate.
- Poast, P. (2012). Does Issue Linkage Work? Evidence from European Alliance Negotiations, 1860 to 1945. *International Organization*, 66(2), 277–310. doi:10.1017/S0020818312000069
- Robert, A., & Keohane, R. O. (1985). Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions. *World Politics*, 38(1), 226-254. doi:10.2307/201035
- Rodriguez, R. (2011). *The Border Dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia - Legal Considerations*. Lulu Publishers.
- Simmons, B. A., & Martin, L. L. (2002). International Organizations and Institutions. In W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse, & B. A. Simmons (Eds.), *Handbook of International Relations*, 192-211. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
- Skilla1st. (2018). *Eritrea Location Map*. From https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Eritrea_location_map.svg

- Sturman, K., & Hayatou, A. (2010). The Peace and Security Council of the African Union: From Design to Reality. In U. Engel, & J. G. Porto (Eds.), *Africa's New Peace and Security Architecture: Promoting Norms, Institutionalizing Solutions* (pp. 57-75). Farnham: Ashgate.
- US Department of State. (2000). *Human Rights Reports for 1999*. Ethiopia. From http://www.state.gov/www/global/humanrights/1999_hrp_report/Ethiopia.html
- Von Stein, J. (n.d.). Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance. *The American Political Science Review*, 99(4), 611–622. doi:10.1017/S0003055405051919
- Zondi, S., & Rejouis, E. (2006). The Ethiopia-Eritrea Border Conflict and the Role of the International Community. *African Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 6(2), 69-83.