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## Impact of Economic Inequality on Democratic Participation in India

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### ABSTRACT

India calls itself the world's largest democracy, and in a lot of ways that's true. We have universal suffrage, regular elections, and a Constitution that promises equality. But there is a real gap between what the Constitution says and what actually happens on the ground, especially when you start asking questions about who participates in democracy and how. This paper tries to understand one specific part of that gap: how economic inequality shapes democratic participation in India. It looks at voting behavior, political awareness, representation in legislatures, and the role of caste, education, and employment. Data from sources like Lokniti–CSDS election surveys, the Association for Democratic Reforms, Oxfam India's 2023 wealth report, and Election Commission of India figures have been used throughout. The main argument is that inequality affects participation not just by keeping people away from polling booths — actually, poor voters in India often turn out in good numbers — but by shaping the quality of that participation. Voting under social pressure, voting without information, and voting for candidates who do not represent your interests once elected: these are the real problems. The paper also looks at what government has tried to do, and what still needs fixing.



## 1. Introduction

There is a moment during every Indian general election that becomes iconic in the news: long queues outside polling booths, elderly voters being carried in on chairs, people walking miles from their villages just to cast a vote. It makes for a powerful image of democracy in action. And in some ways it genuinely is. But it is also worth asking — what happens after the vote is cast? Whose voice actually gets heard?

Think about two voters. One is a construction laborer from a village in eastern UP, earning maybe Rs 300 a day. The other is a software entrepreneur from Bengaluru. Both get exactly one vote. But beyond that single formal equality, almost everything else is different. The laborer may not have reliable access to information about what the candidates actually stand for. He might be under pressure from his landlord or the local strongman to vote a certain way. If he takes the day off to vote, his family might go short on food that evening. And even if he votes sincerely, the people he votes for will probably be people who have never lived anything like his life.

The entrepreneur, meanwhile, probably donated to a party, has at least one contact who knows a politician, gets his political news from multiple sources, and has the time and literacy to evaluate manifestos. His vote formally counts the same, but his participation — in the broader sense of having influence over political outcomes — is incomparably greater.

That gap is what this paper is about. Economic inequality in India is not just about some people having more money than others. It translates into unequal civic capacity, unequal political information, unequal social power, and ultimately, unequal participation in the democratic process. This paper tries to trace how that happens, using India's specific context of caste, rural–urban divides, and the way money has seeped into electoral politics.

## 2. Economic Inequality in India: A Brief Background

India's economic story since 1991 is often told as a success story, and in terms of GDP growth and poverty reduction, there is something to that. Hundreds of millions of people have moved out of extreme poverty over the past three decades. But the growth has been deeply uneven. Oxfam India's report from early 2023 put it starkly: the top 1% of Indians now hold over 40% of the country's total wealth, while the bottom half of the population together own less than 3% of it.



These numbers are hard to fully absorb. But what they mean in practical terms is this: a relatively small group of people controls an enormous share of economic resources, which then translates into social power, political access, and the ability to shape the environment in which democracy operates.

The inequality also runs along lines of caste, gender, and geography in ways that make it particularly sticky. Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes consistently rank at the bottom on income, land ownership, education, and health outcomes. Women earn less than men across almost every sector and have less control over household assets. States like Bihar, Jharkhand, and UP remain far behind in development compared to Maharashtra, Gujarat, or the southern states. These aren't separate problems — they compound each other.

It's also worth saying that India has tried to address these inequalities. MGNREGA was a major step in giving rural workers some income security. Jan Dhan accounts brought banking to millions who had never had one. PM-KISAN gives direct cash transfers to farmers. These programs have had real effects. But the trajectory of inequality itself has continued to steepen, which is the underlying structural problem that this paper is concerned with.

### **3. What Do We Mean by Democratic Participation?**

Most people, when they talk about democratic participation in India, mean voter turnout. That's partly because it's the easiest thing to measure. But participation is actually a much bigger concept.

In political science, participation is understood to include: voting in elections, but also staying informed about political affairs, attending public meetings, contacting elected representatives, being part of political parties or civic organizations, participating in protests or campaigns, and — most fundamentally — having some real influence over the decisions that affect your life. These forms of participation require different resources. Voting mainly requires physical access and registration. Contacting an MP requires literacy and confidence. Influencing party policy requires money, connections, or organizational capacity.

Robert Dahl, one of the foundational thinkers in democratic theory, argued that real democracy requires both the formal right to participate and the actual capacity to do so. India has done well on the formal side — universal suffrage since 1950, regular elections, a free press (mostly). The capacity side is much more uneven.



There's also a distinction worth making between voting and having representation that actually serves your interests. A person can vote in every election for decades and still find that no significant policy change has improved their life. That's not meaningless participation, but it's a much thinner form of democracy than what the Constitution envisions. When we ask about the impact of economic inequality on democratic participation, we have to keep this fuller picture in mind.

#### **4. How Economic Inequality Shapes Voting Behavior**

Here's something that surprises people who are used to Western democracies: in India, poor and lower-income voters often have higher turnout than wealthier groups. The 2019 Lokniti–CSDS National Election Study found that voter turnout was higher among poorer income quintiles than among the top income quintiles in several states. So if you only looked at turnout data, you might conclude that economic inequality isn't really a problem for participation.

But that conclusion misses a lot. The question isn't just whether the poor vote — it's why and how they vote.

Vote buying is one part of this. Political parties, especially in competitive state elections, distribute cash, sarees, alcohol, and household goods before voting. For a family that is struggling, even Rs 500 handed out by a party worker the night before polling matters. Researchers who have studied this in states like Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh have found that voters often take the money but still vote as they choose — so it doesn't fully determine outcomes. But it does shape the texture of participation. When a voter is deciding who to vote for partly based on who gave them a fan or a bag of rice, that is not the deliberative democratic ideal.

Then there is social pressure. In many villages, dominant caste groups or local landlords have significant control over the livelihoods of poorer households. If the landlord makes clear which candidate he wants people to vote for, voting against that preference carries real risks — loss of tenancy, loss of casual employment, social ostracism. This kind of coercion is hard to document but widely acknowledged in field research on Indian elections.

Information inequality is another major factor. A voter who follows politics on multiple channels, reads analysis online, and has friends who discuss policy is in a very different position from a voter in a remote village who gets their political information entirely from local networks that may be biased. This isn't about intelligence — it's about access. And access to political information is very unequally distributed.



## 5. Political Awareness and the Problem of Representation

One of the less-discussed consequences of economic inequality is the gap in political awareness. People with higher education and income tend to engage more deeply with political information — they follow news more regularly, are more aware of policy, and are better equipped to evaluate what their representatives are actually doing. When this kind of engagement is concentrated in upper-income groups, it skews which issues get public attention and political salience.

But let's focus on representation, because this might be the most consequential part of the story. Who actually gets elected to India's Parliament and state assemblies?

According to the Association for Democratic Reforms' analysis of the 2019 Lok Sabha election results, the average declared assets of a winning MP was over Rs 20 crore. Around 88% of elected MPs had declared assets of more than Rs 1 crore. This isn't just about wealth — it tells you something about the social world these legislators come from, the networks they are embedded in, and the pressures they respond to.

Poor people are not just underrepresented among voters in terms of influence — they are almost entirely absent as legislators. An agricultural laborer has essentially no pathway into Parliament under the current system. This creates a structural disconnect between the people who make policy and the people whose lives most depend on it.

There is substantial political science research — including work specifically on India by scholars like Christophe Jaffrelot — showing that the economic composition of legislatures affects policy outcomes. When legislators are predominantly wealthy, issues of redistribution, labor rights, and rural welfare tend to get less serious attention. This is not a conspiracy; it's just a natural outcome of people prioritizing the concerns they understand and share.

## 6. Education, Employment, and Social Class

Education is probably the most direct link between economic inequality and democratic participation. People with more education are more likely to be registered to vote, more likely to contact politicians, more likely to join civic organizations, and more likely to have the skills to navigate bureaucratic processes like filing complaints or applying for government schemes. In a country where literacy rates vary from over 90% in Kerala to under 65% in states like Rajasthan or UP (among certain communities), this creates a major participation gap.



Employment structure also matters in ways that are often overlooked. India's economy is dominated by informal sector work — casual labor, daily wages, seasonal agriculture. For these workers, Election Day being a holiday doesn't actually mean they can afford to take the day off. A man doing construction work on a daily-wage basis doesn't get paid if he doesn't show up. This is less of a barrier in states where elections generate genuine excitement and social pressure to vote, but it does affect the conditions under which participation happens.

Caste continues to be one of the most powerful organizers of economic and political life in India. Despite reservations (which have created important formal representation), upper-caste groups remain overrepresented in professional employment, higher education, and legislative positions. Dalits and Adivasis continue to face both economic disadvantage and social discrimination that limits their independent political agency.

Rohini Pande's influential 2003 research found that political reservation for marginalized groups did increase the likelihood of policy targeting those groups. That's real and important. But there is also a well-documented phenomenon of "proxy candidates" — where reserved constituencies are contested by candidates from marginalized communities who are effectively controlled by dominant-caste patrons. The form of representation exists without always delivering the substance.

## **7. Real Examples and Case Studies from India**

### **7.1 Bihar: Caste, Poverty, and Political Clientelism**

Bihar is an interesting case because it combines high levels of poverty with very high political mobilization. Voter turnout in Bihar regularly matches or exceeds the national average. People vote. But the political economy of voting in Bihar is heavily shaped by caste arithmetic and patron-client relationships. Parties build their coalitions through specific caste alliances, and political support is often secured through delivery of targeted benefits to specific communities rather than through broad programmatic policies.

This is not unique to Bihar, but it is particularly visible there. The implication for democratic quality is significant: voters are participating, but within a framework where their choices are constrained by caste identity, economic dependence, and the calculations of political patrons. That's participation — but it's a particular kind.



## 7.2 Urban Slums: Voting Without Voice

Several studies of slum communities in Mumbai and Delhi have found something that is somewhat disheartening. Voter registration and turnout can be reasonably high in these communities. But qualitative research finds widespread cynicism: many residents feel that voting doesn't actually change their situation, that politicians come before elections and disappear after, and that the real decisions about their neighborhoods are made by developers, builders, and officials in ways that they have no influence over. They vote because it feels like the civic thing to do, or because of local pressure, but not out of any genuine belief in their political agency. This resigned participation is worth paying attention to.

## 7.3 Women's Economic Independence and Political Autonomy

There is growing evidence that women's political participation is directly linked to their economic independence. Where women have their own income, their own bank accounts, and some control over household decisions, they are more likely to vote according to their own preferences rather than following their husband's or in-laws' instructions. Government programs that have put money directly into women's accounts — like PM-KISAN installments and MGNREGA wages going to women's Jan Dhan accounts — have had a modest but measurable effect on female political autonomy in some states. This is one area where economic inclusion and democratic participation are clearly connected in a positive direction.

## 7.4 The 2024 General Election

The 2024 Lok-Sabha election saw overall turnout of around 65.8%, slightly lower than 2019. Post-poll surveys indicated that economic concerns — unemployment, inflation, and concerns about economic insecurity — were among the most cited issues by voters. Young voters in particular seemed highly concerned about employment prospects. The election was also notable for what appears to have been record-breaking electoral expenditure: estimates from various monitoring organizations suggested total spending across all parties and candidates may have exceeded Rs 1 lakh crore, though precise figures are hard to verify given the opacity of Indian political finance. The scale of money flowing through elections is itself a measure of how economic inequality shapes democratic politics.

## 8. Specific Problems Faced by Poor and Marginalized Voters

Let me try to be concrete about what the barriers actually look like for people on the margins of Indian democracy.



Voter registration and documentation remain real obstacles for some groups. Migrant workers who move from their home district to cities for work often end up registered in a constituency where they no longer live, but face practical barriers to updating their registration. Homeless individuals, nomadic communities, and people without fixed addresses struggle to maintain registration at all. These are not huge numbers in the aggregate, but for the individuals affected, it means the formal right to vote does not translate into actual access.

There is also the issue of electoral intimidation. While overt booth capturing and large-scale violence are much rarer than they were in the 1980s and 90s, localized intimidation still occurs, particularly in parts of Bihar, UP, and Jharkhand. For Dalit communities in areas where upper-caste landlords hold economic and social power, the threat of consequences for “wrong” voting is not always hypothetical.

Political finance is perhaps the most systemic problem. The electoral bonds scheme, which allowed corporations and wealthy individuals to make anonymous donations to political parties, was only struck down by the Supreme Court in February 2024. While it lasted, it effectively created a two-tier system of political participation: ordinary citizens had one vote each, while wealthy donors had the ability to fund parties and (by implication) influence policy in ways that ordinary voters simply could not. The judgment was important, but the underlying problem — that money gives the wealthy disproportionate political access — hasn’t gone away.

And then there is the post-election accountability problem. A voter who is poor, not very literate, and lives in a remote area has very limited tools for holding an elected representative accountable between elections. They can’t easily attend parliamentary sessions, write to newspapers, organize legal challenges, or access the MP through personal networks. The formal democratic cycle ends at the ballot box for them in a way it doesn’t for wealthier, better-connected citizens.

## **9. Government Policies and What Could Actually Help**

India has tried various things to address these problems, and it’s worth acknowledging what has worked before talking about what hasn’t.

The reservation system for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in Parliament and state assemblies has created formal representation for groups that would otherwise be almost completely absent from elected bodies. This matters. Research does suggest that having reserved-constituency representatives affects at least some policy outcomes for these communities. Women’s reservation in



panchayati raj institutions, implemented from the 1990s, has brought millions of women into formal political roles at the local level. The long-debated Women's Reservation Bill, finally passed in 2023 as the Nari Shakti Vandan Adhiniyam, promises to bring similar reservation to Parliament and state assemblies, though its implementation is tied to the completion of delimitation.

Welfare programs that reduce economic desperation arguably create conditions for more independent political participation. MGNREGA, by giving rural workers an alternative source of income, reduces their economic dependence on local landlords and employers. Whether this has actually increased political independence is hard to measure, but the theoretical logic is sound.

The Election Commission has been fairly active in improving registration and turnout through campaigns like SVEEP. Voter education, booth-level monitoring, and the Model Code of Conduct during elections have all had positive effects on electoral integrity. The introduction of VVPATs (Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trails) addressed some concerns about EVM reliability, though debates continue.

The Right to Information Act is worth mentioning here too. It gave ordinary citizens a legal mechanism to access government information and has been used effectively by activists, journalists, and ordinary people to hold officials accountable. It requires literacy and some legal knowledge, but civil society organizations have helped make it more accessible.

What still needs to happen? A few things seem particularly important. Improving the quality of public schools — not just enrollment but actual learning outcomes — is foundational, because education is the bedrock of informed participation. Political finance reform needs to go further than the electoral bonds judgment; the opacity of party funding and the enormous role of money in campaigns remain serious problems. Strengthening local governance and giving panchayats real power and resources would bring decision-making closer to communities. And independent, locally-rooted journalism in regional languages needs support, because the information that voters have access to shapes the quality of their participation in fundamental ways.

## 10. Conclusion

What comes out of all this is a picture of a democracy that works, but unevenly and imperfectly. India's elections are real elections. The outcomes are genuine. The fact that a country as large and as diverse as India has managed to hold competitive elections for over seventy years is not a small thing, and it shouldn't be dismissed.



But real democracy requires more than elections. It requires that people across the economic spectrum can participate meaningfully — not just by casting a ballot, but by being genuinely informed, genuinely free from coercion, genuinely represented, and genuinely able to hold power accountable. On these dimensions, India's democracy falls short in ways that are directly connected to its economic inequality.

The poor vote, but they vote in conditions shaped by information gaps, social pressure, economic desperation, and a political system that is heavily influenced by money. The wealthy vote less often in some surveys, but they participate in democracy far more effectively — through donations, connections, media ownership, and direct access to power. Legislators are disproportionately drawn from wealthy, upper-caste backgrounds, which affects what policies get serious attention.

None of this means India's democracy is a sham. It isn't. But it does mean that the project of building a genuinely participatory democracy — one that the Constitution actually envisions — is still unfinished. And that project cannot be separated from the project of reducing economic inequality. These are not two different goals. They are deeply connected.

There are reasons for some optimism. Each generation of Indian voters is more educated, more connected, and more aware of their rights than the last. Civil society — from RTI activists to women's self-help groups to Dalit rights organizations — has expanded the real frontiers of participation. The Supreme Court's electoral bonds judgment showed that constitutional accountability still functions. These are real gains. But inequality is also deepening, and the concentration of economic and political power at the top is a genuine threat to the democratic project. Taking that seriously seems like a necessary first step.



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